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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

National Intelligence Council

SC-8253-82
20 August 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence [REDACTED]

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THROUGH: Chairman, National Intelligence Council [REDACTED]
Vice Chairman, National Intelligence Council

FROM: [REDACTED]
National Intelligence Officer for
General Purpose Forces

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SUBJECT: Military Lessons Learned Studies

1. During your meeting with the NIOs on 23 July 1982, you expressed an interest in current efforts to develop military lessons from the recent conflicts in the Falklands and Lebanon. This memorandum summarizes projects known to be under way or recently completed. [REDACTED]

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2. US Department of Defense

Under the aegis of Dr. Andrew Marshall, DOD is pursuing two projects aimed at the acquisition and analysis of information concerned with the Falklands and Lebanon. [REDACTED]

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4. Central Intelligence Agency

DDI (Product Evaluation Staff) has undertaken a review of Agency production performance in connection with the Falklands crisis. A copy of the questions, methodology and possible outside participants who may be asked to contribute to the effort is attached at Tab G. In addition, DDI/PES has provided substantive information to the Staff of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence which is examining indications and warning aspects of the Falklands affair.

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8. Early Substantive Judgments

Attention during the conflicts and shortly afterwards has focused on a few special developments. Outstanding among these have been the effectiveness of anti-ship missiles and naval surface combatant vulnerabilities in the Falklands war, and air defense suppression and electronic countermeasures (ECM) and counter-countermeasures (ECCM) in Lebanon. Unfortunately, the "fog of war" has pervaded much of the reporting surrounding these matters so that only the most general and tentative conclusions may be drawn regarding any of them at this time. The interpretation or extrapolation of such conclusions for US or Allied circumstances is even more hazardous. Most useful analyses will come only after the principal research work is complete and we have in hand the most reliable information there is to be had. This memorandum is not intended to prejudice any of the study findings. [REDACTED]

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9. I plan to stay in touch with persons working on the studies as they progress. If you wish for me to keep you abreast of developments, I shall do so.

a. I desire further reports _____

*No decision
as of 30 Sep 82*

b. Further reporting not necessary _____

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Attachments:
Tabs A thru I

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SUBJECT: Military Lessons Learned Studies

DCI/NIC/GPF/[REDACTED]

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8 - SRP

9 - FLS [REDACTED]

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10 - NIO/WE

11 - NIO/NESA

12 - NIO/GPF Subj

13 - NIO/GPF Chrono (w/o atts)

14 - NIO/GPF [REDACTED]

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
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CONFLICTS LESSONS LEARNED ORGANIZATION



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STAG PARTY QUESTIONS

Air Warfare Study Group

a. Air-to-Ground Activities	92
b. Air-to-Air Activities	98
c. Drones/RPV's	34
d. Air Launched Missiles and Ordnance	55
e. Support Aircraft	23
f. Cruise Missiles	3
g. Logistics Operations	<u>116 + 52</u>
	473

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Proposed Topic: Falklands Crisis

Questions:

Crisis Warning performance?
 How timely was the intelligence info?
 How quickly and well did we get organized?
 How smoothly did the relationship between CPAS
 and production offices work?
 Did the working group get good and timely support
 from other offices?
 How "forward leaning" (predictive) throughout?
 How good were our predictions?

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Did we appropriately balance our attention to
 political, military and economic dimensions?
 How well served do the customers feel?

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What was the effect of the shortage of military
 analysts in ALA and EURA--both on the Falklands
 work and on other work derailed?

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Methodology:

We will review all forms of product for comprehensiveness,
 consistency, accuracy, etc. We will also review the CPAS overnight
 logs, compare drafts with final copy and look at DDI's work

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The extent of our contact with customers
 will depend on the results of our internal studies.

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Possible Outside Participant(s): Retired Ambassador [redacted]
 (ALA Independent Contractor - definite)

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CIA Annuitant [redacted]

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Retired US Army Col. [redacted]

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